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Comparative Negligence in Strict Products





In the last fifteen years there has been extraordinary growth in
both the conceptual development of strict products liability and the
number of cases filed.' Mirroring that development has been the
equally noteworthy acceptance of comparative negligence in a ma-
jority of jurisdictions. Until the mid 1970's strict products liability
and comparative negligence developed on separate planes with mini-
mal interaction. After a few early decisions considered the applica-
bility of comparative negligence in strict liability, however, there fol-
lowed a multitude of comment discussing the propriety of
intermingling these concepts.'
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vania Bar (1966).
I. In fiscal year 1974 there were 1,579 products liability cases filed in the federal
courts. 1974 Ann. Rep. of the Dir. of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts 240. This
figure increased tremendously by fiscal year 1979 with 6,132 products liability cases being
filed. 1979 Ann. Rep. of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts 227. The 1979 figure
represented a 288% increase over the 1974 figure. Id. The figures for fiscal year 1983 illustrate
another dramatic increase with 9,221 products liability cases being filed that year. 1983 Ann.
Rep. of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts 129. Not only has the number of cases
increased, but also, the cost. Product cases now account for more million-dollar judgments
than any other litigation. The average judgment in a products case has risen from $220,000 in
1972 to over $800,000 in 1981. West, Mass Products Litigation Strains Court, Parties, LiTi-
GATION NEWS, Spring 1984, at 1.
2. See infra notes 21 and 22 for states adopting comparative negligence.
3. See, e.g., Brewster, Comparative Negligence in Strict Liability Cases, 42 J. AIR L.
107 (1976); Feinberg, The Applicability of a Comparative Negligence Defense in a Strict
Liability Suit Based on § 402A of the Restatement of Torts 2D, 42 INs. COUNS. J. 39 (1975);
Kroll, Comparative Fault: A New Generation in Products Liability, 1977 INS. L.J. 492 (No.
655, Aug. 1977); Levine, Strict Products Liability and Comparative Negligence: The Colli-
sion of Fault and No-Fault, 14 SAN DIEGo L. RaV. 337 (1977); Robinson, Square Pegs
Now that the theoretical smoke has cleared and a majority of
jurisdictions have considered the arguments presented by the com-
mentaries and litigants, it is necessary to examine those decisions as
the final word on whether, and how, comparative principles will be
applied in strict liability." This review is particularly important for
practitioners in jurisdictions such as Pennsylvania, where no appel-
late court has squarely considered the issue. Rather than construct-
ing tenuous arguments from the dearth of caselaw and statutory
comment in these undecided jurisdictions, it would be more persua-
sive to demonstrate that the objections to applying comparative prin-
ciples in strict liability have been reconciled by a majority of courts.
The principal purpose of this article will be to examine the deci-
sions meeting such objections and discuss the analysis employed. The
decisions go beyond the semantical and theoretical boundaries es-
poused by some commentators and instead provide a fully evolved
theory of strict products liability. By merging comparative negli-
gence and strict liability the courts have preserved the purposes of
products liability while assuring that the reparation system is not
bankrupted by imposing the entire economic loss of an accident on
the manufacturer.
This article will also examine the practical considerations that
are presented to courts once they make the theoretical hurdle and
decide to apply comparative negligence in strict liability. One such
issue is whether a court should apply pure comparative negligence in
strict liability even where a statute mandates application of a modi-
fied comparative negligence system. Another important practical
consideration is whether comparative negligence should only apply to
specific types of user misconduct. These practical problems are no
less important than the theoretical debate which preceded them. By
limiting the applicability of comparative negligence in strict liability
to certain types of misconduct, the courts may defeat the equitable
(Products Liability) In Round Holes (Comparative Negligence), 52 STATE BAR J. 16 (1977);
Schwartz, Strict Liability and Comparative Negligence, 42 TENN. L. REV. 171 (1974); Twer-
ski, The Many Faces of Misuse: An Inquiry into the Emerging Doctrine of Comparative Cau-
sation, 29 MERCER L. REV. 403 (1978); Wade, Products Liability and Plaintifs Fault-The
Uniform Comparative Fault Act, 29 MERCER L. REV. 373 (1978).
4. Although these authors prefer the term "comparative responsibility," see Pinto,
Comparative Responsibility-An Idea-Whose Time has Come, 45 INs. COUNS. J. 115 (1978),
it is not necessary to belabor semantics. Whether the concept is termed "comparative negli-
gence," "comparative fault," "comparative causation" or "comparative responsibility," the un-
derlying rationale is the same. All of these terms connote some examination of the plaintiff's
conduct in causing the injury and a reduction of the award for that conduct. For convenience
sake the concept will be referred to as comparative negligence throughout this article.
5. Members of the business community have pointed out that products liability as it
has developed threatens the viability of many companies and even whole industries. Under-
standably, the business community has been in favor of comparative negligence in products
liability. See Malott, Let's Restore Balance to Product Liability Law, May-June 1983 HARV.
Bus. REV. 67, 71. See also West, supra note I, at 15.
loss allocation that comparative negligence seeks to achieve.
II. Historical Development
Until the 1970's strict products liability developed autono-
mously from comparative negligence. The basis for the growth in
products liability litigation is the California Supreme Court decision
in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.' and the subsequent
adoption of that holding by the American Law Institute in Section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.7 The doctrine of strict
liability set forth in Greenman was originally espoused by Justice
Traynor in his concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling
Co.8 Although the emphasis of Justice Traynor's opinion was that
manufacturers should be strictly liable, he also noted that liability
should be determined by examining the "safety of the product in
normal and proper use.' '
As strict products liability has developed, however, any serious
consideration of the plaintiff's use of the product has been foreclosed.
A majority of jurisdictions interpreting the Comments to the Re-
statement language'0 have found that contributory negligence is not
a defense in product litigation." Most courts have held that the only
defenses based on the user's conduct are abnormal misuse and as-
sumption of risk.' 2 Thus, the manufacturer is liable unless some exi-
gent circumstance, more weighty than user conduct, justifies shifting
6. 59 Cal. 2d 21, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1962).
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A [hereinafter § 402A] provides:
Special liability of harm of product for physical harm to user or consumer.
(I) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous to the user or consumer or to his property subject is to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property, if(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such as
product, and(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold(2) The
Rule stated in subsection (1) applied although(a) the seller has exercised
all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and(b) the
user or consumer has not brought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
8. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
9. Id. at 468, 150 P.2d at 444.
10. Comment (n) to § 402A provides that, "contributory negligence of the plaintiff is
not a defense when such negligence consists merely in the failure to discover the defect in the
product, or to guard against the possibility of its existence."
II. Although Comment (n) only appears to apply when the plaintiff fails to discover
the defect or guard against the possibility of its existence, a great majority of jurisdictions
have extended the bar to include contributory negligence that amounts to a failure to exercise
ordinary care for one's own safety. See, e.g., Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 240 (1972). The extension of
Comment (n) to a failure to exercise due care for personal safety appears unjustified and is not
supported by the language of the Restatement. Compare Dazenko v. James Hunter Machine
Co., 393 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968) with Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 I11. 2d 418, 261
NE.2d 305 (1970).
12. See Keeton, Products Liability and Defenses - Intervening Misconduct, 15 FO-
RUM 109, 115 (1979); Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence and
Assumption of Risk, 25 VAND. L. REV. 93, 95 (1972).
the risk from manufacturer to consumer.
The defense of abnormal misuse exemplifies that rationale. A
consumer may misuse a product and a defense will arise only if the
use was not "reasonably foreseeable by the seller."' When a con-
sumer does abnormally misuse a product, no defect is proven, and
the manufacturer has not breached a duty to the user.14 In practice,
however, the defense has been difficult to assert since the distinction
between foreseeable misuse and unforeseeable misuse is often elu-
sive 5 and because almost any misuse can be deemed "foreseeable.'"
The only other available defense based on user conduct is as-
sumption of risk. To establish an assumption of risk defense, the
manufacturer must prove that the user "voluntarily and unreasona-
bly proceeded to encounter a known danger.' 1  This inquiry turns on
the plaintiffs subjective knowledge. 8 The assumption of risk defense
has also proven difficult to apply in practice since a plaintiff will
rarely admit to knowledge of the particular danger prior to the
injury. 1
9
The constriction of defenses based on the user's conduct repre-
sented a judicially determined public policy, when faced with the is-
sue of allowing no recovery or holding the manufacturer solely liable,
of placing the entire loss from injury caused by a defective product
on the manufacturer. The harshness of contributory negligence as an
"all or nothing" rule20 was the primary reason why user conduct was
13. See, e.g., Trust Corp. of Montana v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 506 F. Supp. 1093 (D.
Mont. 1981); Roberts v. May, 41 Colo. App. 82, 583 P.2d 305 (1978); Magic Chef, Inc. v.
Sibley, 546 S.W.2d 851 (Tex. Cir. App. 1977). Courts which refuse to apply comparative
negligence in strict liability claiming that the rationales are conceptually incompatible are thus
placed in a hypocritical situation. The manufacturer's foreseeability is a negligence concept
based on reasonableness. See Lancaster v. Jeffrey Galion, Inc., 77 Iil. App. 3d 819, 33 III. Dec.
259, 396 N.E.2d 648 (1979); Greiner v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 540 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 1976).
The user's conduct in an abnormal misuse case has also been labeled in negligence terms, a
form of gross negligence, which if committed by a third party would be a superseding cause.
See Keeton, supra note 10, at 115. Therefore, no matter how doctrinaire some courts may
claim to be, negligence and strict liability concepts have been intermeshed as products liability
has developed.
14. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 172.
15. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 3, at 173; Noel, supra, note 3, at 96.
16. For example, because in a past accident a person drove a car off a bridge into a
river, such an accident may be deemed foreseeable, but it would be unconscionable to require a
manufacturer to produce a car that floats. See Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d
1066, 1070-71 (4th Cir. 1974).
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment (n). See also Thomas v.
Kaiser Agricultural Chemicals, 81 111. 2d 206, 40 Il1. Dec. 801, 407 N.E.2d 32 (1980); Hamil-
ton v. Motor Coach Indus. Inc., 569 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
18. See Clark v. Crane Carrier Co., 69 111. App. 3d 514, 26 Il1. Dec. 41, 387 N.E.2d
871 (1979); Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 397 A.2d 893 (1975).
19. The courts have also gone to great lengths to hinder the assertion of this defense.
See Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Pa. 1971), affid, 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir.
1973) (even though plaintiff knew about the existence of a danger and although he voluntarily
put his hands on the dangerous article, he may not have appreciated the risk of his action). See
also Thomas v. American Cystoscope Makers, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 255 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
20. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 177; Noel, supra note 10, at 111.
not available as a defense as strict product liability developed. Ad-
mittedly, such a complete bar would impinge upon the underlying
purposes of products liability, loss spreading, loss minimization and
compensation.
The doctrine of comparative negligence also arose from a public
policy determination, but one made by state legislatures rather than
the judiciary. Some thirty-five jurisdictions have enacted compara-
tive negligence statutes.21 Another eight jurisdictions apply compara-
tive negligence as a result of judicial adoption.22 Both the statutory
and judicial systems follow a general definition of comparative negli-
gence as a fault concept "that apportions liability for damages 'in
proportion to the contribution of each tortfeasor causing the injury
or damages. 2 3 Under such a system every party is held responsible
to another to the extent that his or her conduct caused the injury."
Various systems of apportionment have been created. There are
three major types: pure comparative negligence, modified compara-
tive negligence, and "slight" vs. "gross" negligence. 5 Under the
21. Arkansas: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27.1755 (1979) (lesser than); Colorado: COLO. REV.
STAT. § 13-21-111 (Supp. 1983) (not as great as); Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-
572H (West Supp. 1984) (not greater than); Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 51-11-7 (1982);
Hawaii: HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-31 (1976) (note greater than); Idaho: IDAHO CODE § 6-801
(1979) (not as great as); Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258A (Supp. 1983) (less than); Loui-
siana: LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2323 (West Supp. 1984) (pure); Maine: ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 14, § 156 (Supp. 1984); Massachusetts: MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85 (Supp. 1984)
(note greater than); Michigan: MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2949 (1983), MICH. STAT. ANN. §
27A-2949 (Callaghan 1983); Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (Supp. 1983) (not as
great as); Mississippi: Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972) (pure); Montana: MONT. CODE
ANN. § 27-1-702 (1979) (not greater than); Nebraska: NEa. REV. STAT. § 25-1151 (1979)
(slight vs. great); Nevada: NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.141 (1979) (not greater than); New Hamp-
shire: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-A (1983) (not greater than); New Jersey: N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:15-5.1 (West Supp. 1983) (not greater than); New York: N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW §
1411-13 (1978) (pure); North Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1975) (not as great as);
Ohio: OHIO REV. CODE § 2315.19 (Page's 1981) (not greater than); Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 23 § II (West. Supp. 1983) (not greater than); Pennsylvania: 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 7102 (Purdon 1984 pamphlet) (not greater than); Puerto Rico: P.R. LAWS ANN. tit.
31, § 5141 (1968); Rhode Island: R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-20-4, -4.1 (Supp. 1983) (pure);
South Carolina: S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 15-1-300 (1977) (limited to automobile accidents),
declared violative of due process clause, Marley v. Kirby, 271 S.C. 122, 245 S.E.2d 604
(1978); South Dakota: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 20-9-2 (1979) (slight v. negligent); Texas:
TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212A (Vernon Supp. 1984) (not greater than); Utah: UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-27-37 (1977) (not as great as); Vermont: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036
(Supp. 1983) (not greater than); Virgin Islands: 5 V.I.C. § 1451 (1983) (not greater than);
Washington: WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.005 (Supp. 1984) (pure); Wisconsin: Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 895-045 (1983) (not greater than); Wyoming: WYo. STAT. § 1-1-109 (1982) (not as
great as).
22. Alaska: Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975) (pure); California: Li v. Yel-
low Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1226 (1975) (pure); Florida:
Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973) (pure); Illinois: Alvis v. Ribar, 85 II1. 2d 1, 52
III. Dec. 23, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981); Missouri: Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11 (Mo.
1983) (en bane) (adopting Uniform Comparative Fault Act); New Mexico: Scott v. Rizzo, 96
N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981); West Virginia: Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256
S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979) (modified system).
23. C. HEFT, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE MANUAL § 1.10 (1978).
24. Id.
25. See supra note 21 for the types of comparative negligence adopted by individual
pure system the plaintiff's recovery is reduced by the percentage of
contributory negligence.26 The plaintiff, however, is permitted to re-
cover no matter what percentage of contributory negligence is af-
fixed. There are two types of modified comparative negligence which
allow recovery as long as the plaintiff's negligence is "less than" or
"not greater than" the defendant's fault. 7 Under both modified sys-
tems any recovery by the plaintiff is reduced by the percentage of his
or her contributory negligence. The "slight" vs. "gross" system only
allows recovery if the plaintiffs negligence was "slight" as compared
to the defendant's which was "gross".8 The modified and "slight"
vs. "gross" systems retain characteristics of the contributory negli-
gence defense since all recovery is barred after the plaintiff's conduct
reaches a certain percentage in causing the accident.
The major public policy reason for abandoning contributory
negligence and adopting comparative negligence was that contribu-
tory negligence failed to distribute responsibility in proportion to
fault.2 9 Inequities were found on both sides under the old system.
For example, a plaintiff who was minimally negligent would be re-
quired to bear the entire loss notwithstanding the defendant's negli-
gence.30 On the other side, under the doctrine of last clear chance,
defendants were required to bear the entire burden even when the
plaintiff was more negligent than defendant in causing the injury.81
Comparative negligence was adopted as an equitable apportionment
system in which each wrongdoer bears the burden of his or her own
fault.32
In considering the applicability of comparative negligence to
strict liability the courts have examined the public policies underly-
ing each doctrine. Although the justifications for adopting compara-
tive negligence in strict liability may differ among courts, there is a
consensus that the socio-economic reasons for the development of
jurisdictions.
26. HEFr, supra note 24, at § 1.50.
27. See supra note 21 for jurisdictions adopting modified comparative negligence
statutes.
28. Only Nebraska and South Dakota have adopted this approach. For a more com-
plete discussion of this system, see HEFT, supra note 23, at § 1.30; Comment, Comparative
Negligence: A look at the South Dakota Approach, 14 S. DAK. L. REV. 92, 94-95 (1969).
29. See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 2d 804, 810, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 862, 532 P.2d
1226, 1230 (1975); HEFT, supra note 23, at § 1.10.
30. See, e.g., Sun Valley Airlines, Inc., v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598, 603
(D. Idaho 1976); McDowell v. Davis, 104 Ariz. 69, 448 P.2d 869 (1968) (contributory negli-
gence is negligence which contributes in any degree to plaintiff's injuries).
31. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 479 (1966). See also Motley v. Robi-
nette, 64 Mich. App. 470, 236 N.W.2d 102 (1975).
32. In jurisdictions that have adopted comparative negligence, either statutorily or judi-
cially, the last clear chance doctrine has been abolished. See, e.g., French v. Grigsby, 571
S.W.2d 857 (Tex. 1978); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d
1226 (1975).
both systems can be served by applying comparative principles in
strict liability.
III. Application of Comparative Negligence in Strict Liability
The concept of comparative negligence in strict liability has
gained widespread approval since 19 80 33 and a substantial majority
of jurisdictions now apply such a system.3' Recent decisions illus-
33. The following 17 jurisdictions have adopted comparative negligence in strict liabil-
ity since 1980: Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Missouri,
Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, Washington,
West Virginia. See infra note 34 for specific cases.
34. See, e.g., Admiralty: Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Construction & Design
Co., 565 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1977); Alaska: Sebring v. Colver, 649 P.2d 932 (Alaska 1982);
Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976); Caterpillar
Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979); Arkansas: Strange v. Stovall, 216 Ark. 53,
546 S.W.2d 421 (1977) (predicting comparative fault could apply in strict liability); Califor-
nia: Mature v. Belco Industries, Inc., 191 Cal. Rptr. 85 (App. 1983); Daly v. General Motors
Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 575 P.2d 1162 (1978); Colorado: Welch v. F.R.
Stokes, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 1054 (D. Colo. 1983) (applying Colorado law) (as to damages not
liability); Florida: West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., Inc., 336 So.2d 80 (Fla. 1976); Hawaii:
Kaneko v. Hilo Coast Processing, 654 P.2d 343 (Haw. 1982); Idaho: Sun Valley Airlines, Inc.
v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598 (D. Idaho 1976) (applying Idaho law); Illinois:
Coney v. J.L.G. Indus., Inc., 97 III. 2d 104, 454 N.E.2d 197 (1983); LaBree v. Schrieber Co.,
116 Ill. App. 3d 15, 452 N.E.2d 1, (1983); Kansas: Forsythe v. Coates Co., Inc., 230 Kan.
553, 639 P.2d 43 (1982); Hardin v. Manitowoc-Forsythe Corp., 691 F.2d 449 (10th Cir. 1982)
(applying Kansas law); Kennedy v. City of Sawyer, 228 Kan. 439, 618 P.2d 788 (1980); Loui-
siana: Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast, Division of Ervin Industries, CCH Products Liability #10,351,
Louisiana Sup. Ct. (Jan. 14, 1985); Kent v. Gulf States Utilities Co., 418 So.2d 493 (La.
1982); Maine: Austin v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 471 A.2d 280 (Me. 1984); Michigan: In
re Certified Questions from the U.S. Court of Appeals, 416 Mich. 558, 331 N.W.2d 456
(1982) (applying MCL 600:2949; MSA 27A-2949); Karl v. Bryant Air Conditioning Co., 705
F.2d 164 (6th Cir. 1983) (applying Michigan law); Minnesota: Lesmeister v. Dilly, 330
N.W.2d 95 (Minn. 1983) (comparative fault statute could apply in breach of warranty action)
(dicta); Busch v. Busch Construction, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977); Mississippi: Ed-
wards v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 512 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1975) (applying Mississippi law);
Missouri: Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d II (Mo. 1983) (en banc) (adopting Uniform Com-
parative Fault Act); Montana: Trust Corp. of Montana v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 506 F. Supp.
1093 (D. Mont. 1981) (applying Montana law); Zahrte v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 498 F. Supp.
389 (D. Mont. 1980) (applying Montana law); New Hampshire: Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843 (1978) (comparative causal fault); Rodrigues v. Ripley
Industries, Inc., 507 F.2d 782 (ist Cir. 1974) (applying N.H. law); New Jersey: Cartel Capi-
tal Corp. v. Fireco of New Jersey, 81 N.J. 548, 410 A.2d 674 (1980) (limited circumstances);
Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Machine Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979); New Mex-
ico: Marchese v. Warner Communications, Inc., 100 N.M. 313, 670 P.2d 113 (N.M. Ct. App.
1983); Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981) (dicta); New York: Murph &
Fritz's Place, Inc. v. Loretta, 112 Misc. 2d 554, 557, 447 N.Y.S.2d 205 (1982); Lippes v.
Atlantic Bank, 69 A.D. 127, 135, 419 N.Y.S.2d 505 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979); North Dakota:
Day v. General Motors Corp., 345 N.W.2d 349 (N.D. 1984); Oregon: Baccelleri v. Hyster
Co., 287 Or. 3, 597 P.2d 351 (1979); Puerto Rico: McPhail v. Municipality of Culebra, 598
F.2d 603 (Ist Cir. 1979) (applying Puerto Rico law); Rhode Island: Fiske v. MacGregor, Div.
of Brunswick, 464 A.2d 719 (R.I. 1982); Tennessee: Norman v. Fisher Marine, Inc., 672
S.W.2d 414 (Tenn. App. 1984) (applying Miss. law); Texas: Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft, 665
S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984); Utah: Moore v. Burton Lumber & Hardware Co., 631 P.2d 865
(Utah 1981); Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1981); Washington: Klein
v. R.D. Weiner, Co., Inc., 654 P.2d 94, 98 Wash. 2d 316 (1982) (en banc); South v. A.B.
Chance Co., 635 P.2d 728 (Wash. 1981) (en banc) (dicta); West Virginia: Star Furniture Co.
v. Pulaski Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d 854 (W.V. 1982); Wisconsin: Powers v. Hunt-Wesson
Foods, Inc., 64 Wis. 2d 532, 219 N.W.2d 393 (1974); City of Franklin v. Badger Ford Truck
Sales, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 641, 207 N.W.2d 866 (1973); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155
trate a fully evolved theory of products liability and a higher level of
theoretical sophistication as compared to early decisions which re-
sorted to characterizing strict liability as negligence per se in order
to justify comparative negligence principles in strict products
liability."a
The objections advanced by theoreticians to comparative negli-
gence in strict product liability, however, have remained unchanged.
One primary objection is that strict liability, which is not based on
fault or negligence, is conceptually incompatible with comparative
negligence principles.86 A corollary argument is that it would be too
difficult for juries to apportion loss because of theoretical problems
involved in comparing the two types of conduct. 37 Another argument
against adopting comparative negligence in strict liability is that
such a system would be a disincentive for manufacturers to produce
safe products, thereby undercutting the doctrine of strict products
liability. 8 A semantical argument has also been made recently based
on comparative negligence statutes which by their specific language
appear restricted to "negligence actions." 9
A. Theoretical Objections
Early decisions applying comparative negligence in strict liabil-
ity did little to answer the arguments raised above. These decisions
relied on a presumption that strict liability was a form of negligence
per se, allowing the courts to sidestep the theoretical conflict.40 For
example, in West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.41 the Supreme Court of
Florida considered whether comparative negligence was a defense in
a strict products liability and breach of implied warranty action. The
court noted that strict liability is "negligence as a matter of law or
negligence per se" which removes the consumer's burden of "proving
N.W.2d 55 (1967); Virgin Islands: Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1979)
(applying Virgin Islands law). Alabama, Kentucky, and Virginia allow contributory negligence
as a defense in strict liability actions rather than comparative negligence. See, e.g., Anderson
v. Black & Decker, Inc., CCH Products Liability #10,406, (D. Ky. November 28, 1984) (ap-
plying Kentucky law); Banner Welders, Inc. v. Knighton, 425 So.2d 441 (Ala. 1982); Ford
Motor Co. v. Bartholomew, 297 S.E.2d 675 (Vir. 1982) (dicta).
35. Compare Murray v. Fairbanks-Morse, 610 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1979) (applying Vir-
gin Islands law) with Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
36. See Melia v. Ford, 534 F.2d 795, 802 (8th Cir. 1976) (applying Nebraska law);
Levine, Strict Products Liability and Comparative Negligence: The Collision of Fault and
No-Fault, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 337, 351-55 (1977).
37. See Smith v. Smith, 278 N.W.2d 155, 160-61 n.7 (S.D. 1979); Levine, supra note
36, at 356.
38. See Carreia v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 388 Mass. 342, 446 N.E.2d 1033,
1039 (1983); Smith v. Smith, 278 N.W.2d 155, 160-61 n.7 (S.D. 1979).
39. See Carreia v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 388 Mass. 342, 446 N.E.2d 1033,
1039 (1983); Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353, 1367 (Okl. 1974).
40. See, e.g., Hagenbuch v. Snap-on Tools Corp., 339 F. Supp. 676 (D.N.H. 1972)
(applying New Hampshire law); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
41. 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976).
specific acts of negligence.""2 The majority concluded that compara-
tive negligence was a defense in a strict liability action if the plain-
tiff's conduct was other than a failure to discover the defect in the
product. 43 Theoretical objections to applying comparative negligence
in strict products liability were not discussed.
One of the first cases to directly confront these objections was
Butaud v. Suburban Marine and Sporting Goods, Inc., (I)." In that
case the plaintiff was racing a snowmobile when a drive belt broke
causing a guard to shatter and injure his eye. The defendant con-
tended that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent because the
snowmobile was not designed for racing and was not properly main-
tained. At trial, the jury was instructed on contributory negligence
and returned a verdict for the defendant. On appeal, the Supreme
Court of Alaska reversed, holding that contributory negligence was
only available as a defense in strict liability when the plaintiff as-
sumed the risk of the particular defect.45 Before the case was retried
the supreme court adopted "pure" comparative negligence in another
decision. 4" The court then agreed to consider the effect of compara-
tive negligence in strict liability actions.
The court began its analysis by discussing and rejecting Wis-
consin and New Hampshire decisions which had adopted compara-
tive negligence in strict liability.47 Those decisions conceptualized
the theory of the action created by strict products liability before
applying comparative negligence principles. 49 The court found that
no matter what characterization was applied to the action the plain-
tiff was essentially required to prove the same elements. 9 Moreover,
the court explained, most jurisdictions had retained a defense based
on the conduct of the plaintiff because they were unwilling to regard
the seller as an insurer of the product.'0
The Butaud (II) court recognized the theoretical difficulty in
comparing the seller's strict liability to the user's negligence, but
found the problem more illusory than real based on the experience of
other jurisdictions. Specifically, the court noted that comparative
negligence had been applied without any serious problems to cases
arising under the doctrine of unseaworthiness, a form of strict
42. Id. at 90.
43. Id. at 92.
44. 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976), modifying Butaud v. Suburban Marine and Sporting
Goods, Inc. (1), 543 P.2d 209 (Alaska 1975).
45. Butaud (1), 543 P.2d 209 (Alaska 1975).
46. Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975).
47. Butaud II, 555 P.2d at 44 (citing Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d
55 (1967); Hagenbuch v. Snap-on Tools Corp., 339 F. Supp. 676 (D. N.H. 1972)).




More important, the court explained that pure comparative neg-
ligence would provide a system of fairness to products liability cases
in which plaintiff and defendant contributed to the injury.5" Appor-
tionment would also avoid the incongruous result of mitigating a
plaintiff's damages if the products liability suit was in negligence,
but allowing full recovery if the suit was brought in strict liability.53
Finally, the majority noted that comparative negligence did not un-
dermine the policy reasons for strict products liability since the man-
ufacturer was still accountable for the harm caused by the defective
product, except that part caused by the user's own conduct.54
Although the Butaud (II) court made a cursory examination of
the effect of comparative negligence on the public policy reasons un-
derlying strict products liability, a complete analysis of this issue was
not undertaken until the seminal California Supreme Court decision
in Daly v. General Motors.55 The decedent in Daly was killed after
his Opel, traveling at a speed of 50 to 70 miles per hour, collided
with a metal divider fence. After striking the fence, the Opel spun
counterclockwise and the driver's door was thrown open. The dece-
dent was ejected from the car and sustained fatal head injuries. The
plaintiffs claimed that the door latch on the vehicle was improperly
designed and should not have activated upon impact." It was undis-
puted that had the decedent remained in the vehicle his injuries
would have been 'minor.57
Over plaintiff's objections, defendants were permitted to intro-
duce evidence at trial showing that: the Opel was equipped with a
seat belt-harness system and a door lock, either of which would have
prevented the decedent's ejection; the decedent used neither the har-
ness system nor the lock; the owner's manual for the vehicle con-
tained warnings that the seat belt should be worn and the doors
locked for "accident security"; and that the decedent was intoxicated
at the time of the collision." The jury returned a verdict for defen-
51. Id. (citing Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409 (1953)).
52. Id. The court noted that the defendant remained strictly liable, but, the award of
damages is reduced in proportion to the plaintiff's contribution to the injury. Id. at 46.
53. Id. at 46. Such a result is particularly questionable considering that a negligent
defendant is clearly more culpable than a defendant that is found strictly liable. See Fiske v.
MacGregor, Div. of Brunswick, 464 A.2d 719, 728 (R.I. 1983).
54. 555 P.2d at 46. The court held that comparative negligence would be applied to
cases where the plaintiff misused the product and would not be limited to cases in which the
plaintiff used the product with knowledge of the defective condition. Id.
55. 20 Cal. 3d 725, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 575 P.2d 1162 (1978).
56. Id. at 730, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 382, 575 P.2d at 1164. The plaintiffs were the dece-
dent's widow and his three surviving minor children. The plaintiffs based their cause of action
on strict liability contending that if the latch was properly designed, the decedent would have
been restrained in the vehicle and would have been injured, but not killed. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 731, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 383, 575 P.2d at 1165. The intoxication evidence was
dants and plaintiffs appealed.
On appeal the Daly court considered and rejected three major
arguments against adopting comparative negligence in strict prod-
ucts liability.5 9 First, the court considered the conceptual and seman-
tical barriers to merging the two concepts and found that the inher-
ent flaw in this "apples and oranges" argument was its insistence on
fixed and precise definitional treatment of legal concepts.6 0 In the
past, there had been conceptual intermingling between tort defenses
and strict products liability so as to obtain a system that would pro-
vide substantial justice.6 Consequently, the court rejected the argu-
ment, concluding that "[f]ixed semantic consistency at this point is
less important than the attainment of a just and equitable result.
The interweaving of concepts and terminology in this area suggests a
judicial posture that is flexible rather than doctrinaire. "62
The second major objection considered by the Daly court was
that application of comparative principles in strict products liability
would reduce or remove the manufacturer's incentive to produce safe
products." The court found that since manufacturers could only re-
duce their liability by the extent of the victim's conduct, and not
completely escape liability, the manufacturer's incentive to produce
safe products would continue. 4 Moreover, manufacturers could not
assume before producing a defective product that ultimately the user
would also be deemed at fault.6
The final objection rejected by the court was that the merger of
the two principles would abolish the liability of intermediaries, such
as retailers, in the chain of distribution.6 The court did not foresee
any difficulty with retaining liability for retailers since a jury could
only admitted for the limited purpose of determining if the decedent had used the safety equip-
ment. Id.
59. The California Supreme Court adopted "pure" comparative negligence in Li v.
Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1226 (1975).
60. 20 Cal. 3d at 734, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 385, 575 P.2d at 1167. The court noted that
strict liability itself was developed because of dissatisfaction with the formalisms of traditional
tort and contract law which did not provide sufficient protection for consumers. The court
explained that comparative negligence similarly arose from dissatisfaction with the traditional
"all or nothing" rule of contributory negligence. Id. at 735, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 385, 575 P.2d at
1167.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 736, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 386, 575 P.2d at 1168. The court added that the
"apples and oranges" argument may itself be conceptually suspect. The court found that the
term "contributory negligence," the basis for the conceptual incompatibility argument, may be
a misnomer since it lacks the basic element of negligence, a duty of care to another. The court
added that the terms "comparative negligence," "contributory negligence," and assumption of
risk" are not capable of exact measurement and the attempt to achieve consistent definitions of
these terms should not divert the court from the more important countervailing public policy
considerations. Id. at 735, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 386, 575 P.2d at 1168.
63. Id. at 737, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 387, 575 P.2d at 1169.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 739, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 388, 575 P.2d at 1170.
assess the legal responsibility of distributors and vendors of the prod-
uct just as they would for manufacturers."
Supported by a majority of the jurisdictions that had considered
the issue, the weight of scholarly comment, and the Uniform Com-
parative Fault Act, the court held that pure comparative negligence
should apply in strict products liability actions.68 The court noted
that apportionment of tort liability was a sound, logical rationale ca-
pable of wider application beyond negligence cases. A contrary deci-
sion, the court explained, would perpetuate the much criticized re-
sult of placing upon one party the entire burden of the loss for which
two were responsible. 69 In concluding, the court set forth fairness as
the underlying basis for applying comparative negligence in strict li-
ability stating, "The law consistently seeks to elevate justice and eq-
uity above the exact contours of a mathematical equation. We are
convinced that in merging the two principles what may be lost in
symmetry is more than gained in fundamental fairness.
70
More recent cases have also stressed fundamental fairness as
the basis for adopting comparative negligence in strict products lia-
bility.7 1 For example, in Coney v. J.L.G. Industries, Inc.,72 the Illi-
nois Supreme Court decided to apply a judicially adopted "pure"
form of comparative negligence in strict products liability after con-
cluding that such a system would not frustrate the fundamental rea-
sons for adopting strict products liability. The court noted that the
gains afforded plaintiffs in strict products liability were not affected
since plaintiffs were still relieved of the proof problems associated
with negligence actions, and because privity and the manufacturer's
negligence were still irrelevant.7 3 Moreover, comparative negligence
did not lessen the manufacturer's duty to produce a reasonably safe
product since the manufacturer's liability remained strict; only its
responsibility for damages was reduced by the amount of the user's
conduct in contributing to the injuries.
7 4
In considering the public policy of loss spreading which under-
lies strict products liability, the Coney court found no reason to
spread the cost of an injury resulting from the plaintiff's own fault
onto the consuming public.75 The court also rejected the theoretical
67. Id.
68. Id. at 739-40, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 388, 575 P.2d at 1170.
69. Id. at 742, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 390, 575 P.2d at 1172.
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., Fiske v. MacGregor, Div. of Brunswick, 464 A.2d 719, 729 (R.I. 1983);
Kaneko v. Hilo Coast Processing, 654 P.2d 343, 352 (Haw. 1982); Zahrte v. Sturm, Ruger &
Co., 498 F. Supp. 389, 391 (D. Mont. 1980).
72. 97 III. 2d 104, 454 N.E.2d 197 (1983).
73. 454 N.E.2d at 202.
74. Id.
75. Id. (citing Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 737-38, 575 P.2d 1162,
1169, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 387 (1978); Fischer, Products Liability-Applicability of Compar-
inconsistency argument that had previously been considered in
Daly.76 In reiterating the fundamental fairness consideration under-
lying the Daly decision, the court stated that equitable principles re-
quired apportionment of a plaintiff's total damages on the basis of
the degree to which the product and the user's conduct proximately
caused them.
77
Rather than simply rely on the fundamental fairness of such a
system, several courts have labored to find a theoretically consistent
common denominator by which to compare user and manufacturer
conduct. The most widely accepted view is the use of causation as
the relevant factor.7 8 For example, in Murray v. Fairbanks Morse,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, applying
Virgin Islands law, considered the appropriate "conceptual bridge"
between the plaintiff's conduct and manufacturer's product.79 The
court rejected the use of "fault" as the comparative factor, noting
that in products liability there is no proven fault on the part of the
manufacturer that can be compared with the faulty user conduct.8"
Moreover, even if the manufacturer's conduct could be termed
faulty, the parties' injury producing conduct is qualitatively differ-
ent.81 The court concluded that causation was the only conceptual
basis by which to apportion the loss and that the significant inquiry
is how much of the injury was caused by the defect versus the
amount caused by plaintiff's own actions.82 Thus, a defendant is
strictly liable once a jury determines a defect caused the injury, but,
the jury may then reduce the award in proportion to plaintiff's con-
tribution to the cause of injury. 8
B. The Semantic Objection
One argument recently presented in opposition to the adoption
of comparative negligence in strict liability is based on several state
comparative negligence statutes which by their very language appear
only to apply to "negligence actions. 84 Courts considering this ob-
ative Negligence, 43 Mo. L. REV. 431, 433 (1978)).
76. 454 N.E.2d at 202.
77. Id. at 203.
78. See, e.g., Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1979) (applying Vir-
gin Islands law); Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Construction & Design Co., 565 F.2d
1129 (9th Cir. 1977) (applying admiralty law); Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming
Corp., 411 F.Supp. 598 (D. Idaho 1976) (applying Idaho law); Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,
665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984).
79. 610 F.2d at 160.
80. Id. at 159.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 160.
84. The following state statutes contain this terminology:
Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Massachusetts, Montana, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas,
jection have applied two approaches to overcome the semantic bar-
rier. Several courts have gone beyond the statutory language to ex-
amine the legislative intent and policy behind the comparative
negligence statute, concluding that the statute should apply in strict
products liability.85 The other approach rejects application of the
comparative negligence statute based on the statutory language and
instead judicially adopts some form of comparative negligence in
strict products liability.86
The first approach is illustrated by the Supreme Court of New
Jersey decision in Suter v. San Angelo Foundry and Machine Co.
87
The New Jersey statute in that case provided that comparative negli-
gence would be applied "in an action . .. for negligence." 88 The
court admitted that the statutory phrase could be read literally so as
to only include traditional negligence actions, but held that such a
reading would not be consistent with the underlying purpose of the
statute.8 9 In examining the legislative history behind the statute, the
court found that when the statute was enacted contributory negli-
gence was a defense in strict liability and there was no indication
that the legislature intended to abrogate examination of the user's
conduct by enacting the comparative negligence statute. 90 The stat-
ute was only aimed at softening the harshness that the complete bar
contributory negligence presented.
The Suter court also found support for its conclusion in legisla-
tive history which indicated a conscious attempt on the part of the
legislature to adopt a statute similar to the Wisconsin comparative
negligence statute.91 Since Wisconsin courts had previously applied
their comparative negligence statute to strict liability actions, the
court reasoned that the New Jersey legislature may have believed its
Utah, Vermont, Virgin Islands, Wisconsin and Wyoming. Of those states with such statutes,
Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota,
Texas, Utah, and Wisconsin all apply comparative negligence in strict products liability. See
supra note 34 for cases from the above jurisdictions adopting comparative negligence in strict
liability. State statutes in Arkansas, Maine, Mississippi, Nevada, and Rhode Island do not
contain any limitations on the actions to which the statute can apply. Schwartz, Comparative
Negligence § 12.1 at 196 (1974). Other states, such as Connecticut, Michigan and Nebraska
have enacted comparative negligence statutes which specifically apply to strict products liabil-
ity. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572-0 (West Supp. 1984); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A-2949
(Callaghan Supp. 1984-1985); MICH. COMP. LAws § 600.2949 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-
1151 (1979).
85. See, e.g., Hardin v. Manitowoc-Forsythe Corp., 691 F.2d 449 (10th Cir. 1982)
(applying Kansas law); Murray v. Fairbanks-Morse, 610 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1979) (applying
Virgin Islands law); Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598 (D.
Idaho 1976) (applying Idaho law).
86. See, e.g., Day v. General Motors, 345 N.W.2d 349 (N.D. 1984); Zahrte v. Sturm,
Ruger and Co., 498 F. Supp. 389 (D. Mont. 1980) (applying Montana law).
87. 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979).
88. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:15-5.1-5.3 (West Supp. 1984).
89. 81. N.J. at 160, 406 A.2d at 145.
90. Id. at 161, 406 A.2d at 145.
91. Id.
statute would receive a similar interpretation.92 The court concluded
that the term "negligence" in the statute should be construed as be-
ing "subsumed within the scope of tortious fault."93 Based on that
conclusion, the court held that the Comparative Negligence Act was
applicable in strict liability actions where the plaintiff's conduct
could be found to constitute contributory negligence.
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The second approach for overcoming the semantic barrier
presented by a comparative negligence statute was utilized in Zharte
v. Sturm, Ruger & Co.95 The federal district court, applying Mon-
tana law, found, based on fundamental fairness and a review of case
law from other jurisdictions, that comparative negligence should be
applied in strict products liability. The court was then faced with the
issue of whether Montana's comparative negligence statute, which
referred to recovery of "damages for negligence resulting in death or
injury to person or property," should be applied.9" By its terms, the
statute only applied to recovery of damages for negligence. 97 The
court reasoned that since strict liability actions were not based on
negligence, statutory comparative negligence could not be applied in
a strict liability action9" unless expressly provided by the legisla-
ture.99 Instead of applying the statute, the court judicially adopted a
pure form of comparative negligence in strict liability actions. 100 The
court opined that the judicial adoption of a pure comparative negli-
gence system would also avoid a "windfall" for defendants under the
modified comparative negligence system in the Montana statute. 101
The semantic problem presented in the Suter and Zharte cases
will probably be ameliorated in the future as state legislatures
amend their comparative negligence statutes. In states that have en-
acted or amended statutes which refer to actions for damages from
the "fault' 0°' of another, or refer to "all actions" for damages, 03 or
92. Id. The court noted that in Hagenbuch v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 339 F. Supp. 676,
682-683 (D. N.H. 1972), the New Hampshire comparative negligence statute was similarly
interpreted to apply to strict liability actions on the basis of the Wisconsin statute and caselaw.
Id.
93. 81 N.J. at 162, 406 A.2d at 145.
94. Id. at 164, 406 A.2d at 147. On the basis of the facts before it, however, the court
found that the Comparative Negligence Act should not be applied. Id., 406 A.2d at 147-48.
95. 498 F. Supp. 389 (D. Mont. 1980).
96. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-702 (1979).
97. 498 F. Supp. at 392.
98. Id. See also Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843
(1978).
99. 498 F. Supp. at 392.
100. Id.
101. Id. See also Day v. General Motors, 345 N.W.2d 349 (N.D. 1984) (rejecting mod-
ified comparative negligence statute and applying pure comparative negligence.
102. See Austin v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 471 A.2d 280 (Me. 1984) ("comparative
fault" statute could apply in strict products liability).
103. See Fiske v. MacGregor, Div. of Brunswick, 464 A.2d 719 (R.I. 1983).
which specifically apply to strict products liability actions," 4 the
courts have had an easier time avoiding this argument.
IV. Future Practical Considerations
After courts overcome the theoretical and semantical barriers to
applying comparative negligence in strict products liability, there are
practical problems to confront. One such problem is pointed out by
the Zharte decision in which the court refused to apply the Montana
modified comparative negligence statute, but judicially adopted a
pure form of comparative negligence in strict liability."' 5 Unlike con-
struing a reference to "negligence" in a Comparative Negligence
Act as applying to strict liability actions, refusing to apply a legisla-
tively mandated system of apportionment undercuts the statute and
thwarts public policy as determined by the legislature. Courts should
be loath to disregard a modified comparative negligence statute be-
cause of their decision that pure comparative negligence is the better
rule of law.
A careful analysis of this issue was undertaken by the Kansas
Supreme Court in Forsythe v. Coates Co.'°6 The Kansas legislature
had enacted a modified system of comparative negligence.10 7 The
court recognized that it could judicially adopt a pure comparative
negligence system for strict liability actions while maintaining the
modified system in other tort actions, 0 8 but found that the choice
between a pure or modified system was a policy decision made by
the legislature. The decision whether to adopt pure or modified com-
parative negligence for strict liability actions involved a balancing of
the purposes of strict liability and comparative negligence.' 09 In
striking that balance, the court found that it could not ignore the
public policy decision of the legislature to create a modified negli-
gence system.110 Adopting a pure comparative fault system would
represent judicial intrusion into the legislative sphere and would also
create a dual system of comparative negligence, one for strict liabil-
ity cases and another for traditional tort actions. Although the court
recognized deficiencies in the modified system, it did not find such a
system inherently inconsistent with the policies of strict liability.'
The court concluded that it would apply the modified comparative
104. See In re Certified Questions from the U.S. Court of Appeals, 416 Mich. 558, 331
N.W.2d 456 (1982).
105. 498 F. Supp. at 392.
106. 230 Kan. 553, 639 P.2d 43 (1982).
107. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258A (1974).
108. 230 Kan. at 556-57, 639 P.2d at 45.




negligence statute rather than frustrate the public policy declared by
the legislature. " 2
The Forsythe decision exemplifies the appropriate deference to
legislative public policy decisions in this area. Legislative creation of
an apportionment system represents a careful balancing of the goals
of tort law. This balancing should not be callously upset by the judi-
ciary. The alternative of a judicially adopted pure comparative negli-
gence system, however, cannot be harshly criticized. Adoption of a
pure comparative negligence system over the legislatively mandated
modified system may be necessary to make the application of com-
parative negligence in strict products liability more palatable to
those courts who have in the past refused to recognize such a system.
The ultimate goal is to achieve the equitable loss allocation that
comparative negligence principles bring to strict products liability.
A second practical consideration faced by courts is delineating
the types of plaintiff misconduct that should reduce damages in a
strict products liability action. Several courts that apply comparative
negligence principles when a plaintiff makes an unforeseeable misuse
of a product or assumes the risk of use have refused to apply com-
parative negligence when the plaintiff failed to discover the defect or
when the plaintiff's misuse was foreseeable. 1 8
Limiting application of comparative negligence to certain types
of plaintiff conduct erodes the basic fairness and equitable loss allo-
cation that is an objective of a comparative negligence system. As
Professor Schwartz argues, a defendant should bear some responsi-
bility if the defendant should have foreseen the misuse; however, it is
also appropriate to reduce the user's award by the amount of fault
affixed to him or her by the jury." " Professor Schwartz also notes
that applying comparative negligence principles to all forms of user
misconduct will relieve the courts from the difficult line drawing be-
tween unforeseeable misuse and foreseeable misuse." 5
The other limitation on considering user conduct has occurred
when the plaintiff fails to discover or guard against a product defect.
In Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Construction and Design
Co.,"" the court considered and rejected such a limitation on com-
parative negligence in strict products liability. The court recognized
that comment (n) to section 402A would prohibit "contributory neg-
ligence" as a defense when the plaintiffs conduct consisted of failure
112. Id.
113. See, e.g., West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., Inc., 336 So. 2d 80, 92 (Fla. 1976);
Austin v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 471 A.2d 280, 286 (Me. 1984); Suter v. San Angelo
Foundry and Machine Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140, 153 (1979).
114. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 173-74.
115. Id. at 173.
116. 565 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1977).
to discover the product defect, but reasoned that such labels were
"merely refugees from the old, harsh 'all or nothing' rule of contrib-
utory negligence."'" The court found that any label which allows a
plaintiff to recover full damages even though partially at fault was
not consistent with comparative fault principles." 8 Such a limitation
on the application of comparative fault would be inequitable since
responsibility would not be distributed in proportion to fault and
would place upon one party the entire burden of a loss for which
both parties were responsible." 9
For example, the court noted that if the user's failure to dis-
cover or guard against a product defect was highly irresponsible and
the product defect was slight, it would offend the court's "sense of
justice and fair play" to impose the entire loss on the manufac-
turer. ' The court found no reason why society as a whole should
bear the portion of blameworthy conduct attributable to the plaintiff.
Therefore, the court concluded that all of the plaintiff's conduct con-
tributing to the cause of injury could be compared to the defendant's
liability.' 2 ' The Pan-Alaska Fisheries approach assures that the eq-
uitable loss allocation sought to be achieved by applying comparative
negligence in strict products liability will not be undercut by hinging
application of comparative fault on the type of plaintiff misconduct.
V. Conclusion
Although the principles of comparative negligence and strict
products liability developed separately, an overwhelming majority of
courts considering the issue have concluded that comparative negli-
gence should apply in strict liability actions.12 Both strict liability
and comparative negligence are based on socio-economic policies. By
examining the underlying policies, courts have been able to overcome
the semantical and theoretical barriers to applying comparative neg-
ligence in strict liability.
The primary reason that comparative negligence has not been
found inconsistent with the purpose of strict liability is because is
does not in any manner relieve the manufacturer from a duty to cre-
117. Id. at 1139 (citing Sun Valley Airlines v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598,




120. Id. at 1140.
121. Id. See also Hardin v. Manitowoc-Forsythe Corp., 691 F.2d 449, 454 (10th Cir.
1982) (applying Kansas Law) (all types of fault, regardless of degree, are to be compared in
order to apportion the causal responsibility for the accident).
122. See supra note 34 for jurisdictions adopting comparative negligence in strict
liability.
ate a safe product.123 By applying comparative negligence, however,
the court can examine the conduct of all parties involved in causing
the injury. Such an analysis allows an equitable allocation of loss
and assures that society does not bear the burden of the plaintiff's
blameworthy conduct. 124 Allocating a proportion of cost to the culpa-
ble user by reducing the award is a sound public policy decision fully
consistent with equity and fairness.
Now that a majority of the courts have considered and rejected
the theoretical and conceptual objections to applying comparative
negligence in strict liability, these arguments can be put to rest.
There are, however, important practical considerations that must be
considered in the future. In determining how the comparative negli-
gence system will be applied, courts should be reluctant to disregard
a legislatively mandated system in favor of one advanced by the
court. More important, courts should not limit application of com-
parative negligence to particular types of user misconduct. All in-
jury-producing conduct, whether on the part of defendant of plain-
tiff, should be considered if comparative negligence in strict products
liability is to achieve its designed purpose of equitable loss allocation.
123. See, e.g., Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 575
P.2d 1162, 1169 (1978); Coney v. J.L.G. Industries, Inc., 97 I1l. 2d 104, 454 N.E.2d 197, 202
(1983).
124. See, e.g., Murray v. Fairbanks-Morse, 610 F.2d at 161; Coney v. J.L.G. Industries,
Inc., 454 N.E.2d at 202; Schwartz, supra note 3, at 177. As the Murray court notes, if the
negligence of the plaintiff is ignored in determining the plaintiffs loss, the future cost of the
manufacturer's product will be artificially inflated and not representative of the actual risk
posed by the product. The detriment to the community at large, other than absorbing the cost
of the plaintiff's conduct, is that consumers may be forced to choose cheaper, less safe products
because the cost of the manufacturer's product is artificially high. 610 F.2d at 161.

